Nowak and May, using a spatial model in which local interactions occur between individuals occupying neighboring nodes on a square lattice, show that stable population states for the prisoner's dilemma depend upon the specific form of the payoff matrix.

Tweet

- Nowak and May, using a spatial model in which local interactions occur between individuals occupying neighboring nodes on a square lattice, show that stable population states for the prisoner's dilemma depend upon the specific form of the payoff matrix.
- There is no "stable strategy" in the traditional dynamical sense.. These models demonstrate that, numerous cases exist in which both approaches to evolutionary game theory arrive at the same conclusion regarding which strategies one would expect to find present in a population, there are enough differences in the outcomes of the two modes of analysis to justify the development of each program
- If one seeks to use an evolutionary game theoretic model to explain the normativity attached to a social rule, one must explain how such an approach avoids committing the so-called "naturalistic fallacy" of inferring an ought-statement from a conjunction of is-statements.
- Assuming that the explanation does not commit such a fallacy, one argument charges that it must be the case that the evolutionary game theoretic explanation merely repackages certain key value claims tacitly assumed in the construction of the model

Need more features? Check out our Chrome Extension and save interactive summary cards to your Scholarcy Library.